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COMMENTS
to the intent necessary to constitute the crime. In so doing, it
recognizes that the purpose of the statute is to protect the
emotionally and sexually immature rather than all females
under a certain age. It recognizes that age may be indicative
of sexual immaturity and that in such cases a mistake of age
would lack a reasonable basis. In so recognizing, it does not
ignore the intent of the male, but simply infers that, in par-
ticular circumstances, the male must have intended to take ad-
vantage of an immature girl. As a result, each case can be
treated on its facts and such abuses of justice as the previous
rule fostered can be avoided.
As has been seen, the central issue in statutory rape seems
to be that of operative consent. The Hernandez decision does
not go far enough to confront this issue directly. It allows
mistake of age to be a defense, but does not extend the defense
to cases where, although there is no mistake of age, the girl
is sexually mature and comprehends the nature of her consent.
If, as seems likely, the statute was not designed to protect this
wise but underage female, if follows that one should treat as
rebuttable the presumption that a young girl lacks the capacity
to consent. The defendant should be allowed to introduce
evidence to show that the girl understood the significance of the
act and her consent should therefore have the same effect as
that of a legally mature female. It is submitted that the female's
capacity to grant operative consent could be a question for the
jury, just as it is in rape cases where the girl is alleged to be
mentally incompetent. This rebuttable presumption would
continue to protect the naive and innocent, but the law would
no longer punish the man who copulates with a girl fully capable
of understanding the significance of her participation.
Richard A. Tonry
FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX: EFFECT OF LOU-
ISIANA POWERS TO REVOKE INTER VIVOS DONATIONS
The basic incident of taxation by the federal estate or gift
tax' is the transfer of property. The estate tax is imposed on
the transfer of property at death 2 and on certain inter vivos
1. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, subtitle B.
2. Id. §§ 2001, 2031, 2051. See Chase Nat'l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S.
327 (1928) ; McCaughn v. Fidelity Trust Co., 34 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1929);
19651
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVI
transfers which have the same effect as transfers on death and
so should be taxed identically.8 The federal gift tax is imposed
on the transfer of property by gift,4 and was enacted primarily
Lederer v. Northern Trust Co., 262 Fed. 52 (3d Cir. 1920). For a more com-
plete explanation, see LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES
§§ 2.1-2.4 (1962).
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2033-2042.
Id. § 2042: "The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all prop-
erty-
"(1) Receivable by the executor. - To the extent of the amount receivable
by the executor as insurance under policies on the life of the decedent.
"(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries. -To the extent of the amounts re-
ceivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the life of the
decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the
incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other
person. For purposes of the preceding sentence, the term 'incident of ownership'
includes a reversionary interest (whether arising by the express terms of the
policy or other instrument or by operation of law) only if the value of such
reversionary interest exceeded five percent of the value of the policy immediately
before the death of the decedent. As used in this paragraph, the term 'rever-
sionary interest' includes a possibility that the policy, or the proceeds of the
policy, may return to the decedent or his estate, or may be subject to a power
of disposition by him. The value of a reversionary interest at any time shall
be determined (without regard to the fact of the decedent's death) by usual
methods of valuation, including the use of tables of mortality and actuarial
principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the secretary or his delegate.
In determining the value of a possibility that the policy or proceeds thereof may
be subject to a power of disposition by the decedent, such possibility shall be
valued as if it were a possibility that such policy or proceeds may return to the
decedent or his estate."
4. Id. §§ 2501, 2502, 2503, 2521. Though the tax liability is the primary
obligation of the donor, the tax law provides for a lien on the property in the
event of nonpayment by the donor. Id. § 6324(b) : "Lien for Gift Tax. -Except
as otherwise provided in this subsection (c) (relating to the transfers of securi-
ties), the gift tax imposed by chapter 12 shall be a lien upon all gifts made
during the calendar year, for ten years from the time the gifts are made. If
the tax is not paid when due, the donee of any gift shall be personally liable for
such tax to the extent of the value of such gift. Any part of the property com-
prised in the gift transferred by the donee (or by a transferee of the donee) to
a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth shall be divested of the lien herein imposed and
the lien, to the extent of the value of such gift, shall attach to all the property
(including after-acquired property) of the donee (or the transferee) except any
part transferred to a bona fide purchaser, mortgagee, or pledgee for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth."
Id. § 6325(a) : "Release of the lien.- Subject to such rules or regulations
as the Secretary or his delegate may prescribe, the Secretary or his delegate
may issue a certificate of release of any lien imposed with respect to any internal
revenue tax if -
"(1) Liability satisfied or unenforceable. - The Secretary or his delegate
finds that the liability for the amount assessed, together with all the interest in
respect thereof, has been fully satisfied, has become legally unenforceable, or, in
the case of the estate tax imposed by chapter 11 or the gift tax imposed by
chapter 12, has been fully satisfied or provided for .... "
Thus the donee can be required to pay the gift tax from the gift he received.
Such a possibility troubled the courts in cases in which the status of revocable
gifts were at issue, since the donee could lose the gift on which he had paid the
gift tax. See Porter v. Commissioners, 288 U.S. 436 (1933).
It was finally recognized by the Supreme Court that the donee who paid the
tax would always have a cause of action against the revoking party for the
amount paid, and if the revoker were the donor, he would have a credit available
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to prevent avoidance of the estate tax by inter vivos transfers. 5
Neither tax statute, however, defines explicitly the types of
transfers reached. Insofar as the statutes speak of transfers,
they employ concepts of property law taken from a common law
background. The federal law is thus dependent on state prop-
erty law concepts of a transfer. Little difficulty is experienced
in applying the concept of a death tax to Louisiana successions.
Problems may arise, however, in determining the impact of the
federal estate tax on lifetime transfers governed by Louisiana
law. Similarly, it may be difficult to determine when the trans-
fer is complete within the requirements of the gift tax under
Louisiana law.
The moment of imposing the gift tax is the time when the
donor relinquishes ownership and control over the property.8 A
transfer complete for gift tax purposes usually is sufficiently
complete to transfer ownership of the property from the donor's
estate.7 It is possible, however, to have a transfer which is suffi-
ciently complete to be taxed as a gift, but not sufficiently com-
plete to remove the donation from the donor's estate. Thus, for
example, a gift made in contemplation of death is subject to both
taxes.8 Other types of gift in the same category include trans-
for himself, since he would have finally paid the tax. See Phillip-Jones Corp. v.
Parmley, 302 U.S. 233 (1937).
This astute determination by the Court solves any problem of double taxa-
tion on a transfer. Though this double taxation is within the power of Congress,
it should be remembered that the gift tax is meant to supplement the estate tax.
See note 5 infra. Sanford v. Commissioner. 308 U.S. 39, 45 (1939) : "The gift
tax statute does not contemplate two taxes upon a gift not made in contemplation
of death."
The court said in Higgins v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U. S. 658 (1942), that Sanford was not to be understood to mean,
however, that a transfer inter vivos is never subject to gift tax, if, notwithstand-
ing the transfer, the property is to be included in the gross estate for estate
taxation.
5. Committee Reports on the 1932 act stressed prevention of both income and
estate tax avoidance. H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932) ; Sen.
Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1932). See also Magill, The Federal
Gift Tax, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (1940) ; Warren, Correlation of Gift and Estate
Taxes, 55 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1941) ; Harris, Legislative History of Federal Gift
Taxation, 18 TAXES 531, 533 (1940).
6. See Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943) ; Smith v. Shaughnessy,
318 U.S. 176 (:1943) ; Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939) ; Burnet v.
Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) (landmark case); Higgins v. Commissioner,
129 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942) ; Herzog v. Com-
missioner, 116 F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Hernstadt v. Hoey, 47 F. Supp. 874
(S.D.N.Y. 1942).
7. See LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 24.4 (1962).
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2035: "(a) GENERAL RULE. - The value of the
gross estate shall include the value of all proprety (except real property situated
outside the United States) to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale
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fers with retained possession or enjoyment.9 The Supreme Court
has often held that the federal estate and gift taxes are not mu-
tually exclusive, 10 and Congress, therefore, has provided that if
a transfer becomes subject to the estate tax after having been
taxed as a gift, the gift tax payment may be used as a credit
against any estate tax.".
VOID AND VOIDABLE GIFTS
Even if the donor does not expressly reserve the power to
avoid or revoke a donation, state law may prescribe the condi-
tions under which donations can be voided or revoked. Some
donations are void at their inception by reason of some inherent
defect or stipulation of law. Others can be revoked. But the
economic result in either event is the same: the property returns
to the donor.
In most states the causes for which inter vivos donations can
be revoked are not as numerous as those in Louisiana. 2 There
are, in addition, many powers "to amend, alter, revoke, or ter-
minate"' 3 in trust law that are analogous to many of the causes
for revocation of gifts set forth in the Louisiana Civil Code.
Outright Gifts
The law of every state provides some conditions for voiding
inter vivos donations. If a lifetime gift is made that is subject
to revocation when the donor dies, this property may be included
for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth), by trust or
otherwise, in contemplation of his death.
"(b) APPLICATION OF GENERAL RULE.- If the decedent within a period of
3 years ending with the date of his death (except in a case of a bona fide sale
.) transferred an interest in property, relinquished a power, or exercised or
released a general power of appointment, such transfer, relinquishment, exercise,
or release shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in
contemplation of death . . . but no such transfer . . . made before such 3 year
period shall be treated as having been made in contemplation of death."
Any gift made within three years of death would not be exempt from the
gift tax because it was made in contemplation of death. Id. § 2503(a). Such
is the rule since one dies not knowing that death will come within three years.
See Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
9. Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1942).
10. See, e.g., Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943) ; Sanford v. Com-
missioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939). It has been suggested, however, that even though
a gift will be included in the donor's estate, it is generally better to make the
donation because of the operation of the credit for gift taxes and removal of the
amount paid as taxes from the donor's estate. See Phillips, Income, Gift and
Estate Taxation of Living Trusts, 42 TAXES 374 (1964).
11. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2012.
12. Cf. Wisdom & Pigman, Testamentary Dispositions in Louisiana Estate
Planning, 26 TUL. L. REV. 119 (1952).
13. See note 15 infra, and accompanying text.
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in his taxable estate.14 The Internal Revenue Code spells out
with seeming precision the revocable gifts which are and are not
to be included in the gross estate:
"The value of the gross estate shall include ... all property
•.. where the enjoyment thereof was subject at the date of
his death to any change through the exercise of a power...
by the decedent alone or by the decedent in conjunction with
any other person ... to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate,
or where any such power is relinquished in contemplation of
decedent's death."'
15
The Regulations and Code are mute as to the gift tax treat-
ment of transfers voidable by the donor, his representative, or
others because of some element in the transaction. 16 However,
the courts have held that if the donor has the power to revoke
a transfer, it is immaterial whether the power to revoke arises
by specific reservation or by operation of law.'7 Most of the
cases in this area have arisen in connection with the estate tax,
but the reasoning of the court is sometimes useful in ascertain-
ing whether a gift tax becomes due when the transfer is ini-
tially made.' 8
Insanity
In dealing with a donation voidable by reason of the donor's
insanity, although he had not been adjudged non compos mentis,
the United States Fourth Circuit Court held in Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Tait 9 that the donation to the donor's wife was
complete and hence was not to be included in his gross estate
for estate tax purposes. The court reasoned that the "practical
mind" would not consider the property as part of the decedent's
estate ;20 furthermore, the government could not reach the prop-
14. -INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037(a) (1).
15. Id. § 2038.
16. See 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 16.04 (1942) ; but cf.
Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 180.
17. Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942) ; Hughes v. Com-
missioner, 104 F.2d 144 (9th Cir. 1939) ; Estate of McIntosh, 25 T.C. 794
(1956) ; Keiffer v. Commissioner, 44 B.T.A. 1265 (1941).
18. But cf. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943). The test of a com-
plete transfer for purposes of the gift tax is not whether the transfer is complete
under the estate tax, but whether the property has passed beyond the control
of the donor. Cf. LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAX § 24.4
(1962). The test, however, in most cases will be the same.
19. 54 F.2d 383 (D. Md. 1931) ; 3 F. Supp. 51 (D. Md. 1933), aff'd, 70
F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1934).
20. 54 F.2d 383, 387 (D. Md. 1931). The court did hedge its broad rejection
of the government's contention with the thought that a tax evasion motive behind
the failure to attack the conveyance might call for a different judicial response.
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erty since the decedent's succession representative had failed
to make a direct attack on the conveyance. 21
In Louisiana the donor must be of sound mind22 at the time
of the donation 23 for it to be valid. The Code conditions2 4 are
substantially the same as those found in Safe Deposit & Trust
Co. v. Tait25 and thus there is no reason to believe that the re-
sults of a similar Louisiana case would differ.
Since the gift tax was intended to supplement the estate tax,
the logical extension of the decision is that if the donation was
sufficiently complete to remove the property from the donor's
taxable estate, it was complete as a gift when made and hence
was then subject to the gift tax. 26
Minority
Under the Civil Code a minor lacks the capacity to make an
inter vivos donation.27 The jurisprudence has characterized the
prohibited gift as a relative nullity.28 The power to void the
gift is intended for the protection of the minor, and when he
becomes of age, he may ratify or disaffirm the transaction."
The same rule applies at common law.
The Allen case, s0 which dealt with a gift by a minor, held
that so long as the right to disaffirm exists, the gift remains
incomplete. The gift would become taxable at the moment the
power to revoke expired.8 ' In cases in which the power is termi-
21. Ibid.
22. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1475 (1870) : "To make a donation either inter vivos
or mortis causa, one must be of sound mind."
23. Id. art. 1472: "It is sufficient if the capacity of giving exists at the mo-
ment the donation is made."
24. See id. arts. 1788, 1789.
25. 54 F.2d 383 (D. Md. 1931), 3 F. Supp. 51 (D. Md. 1933), aff'd, 70
F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1934).
26. 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 16.04 (1942). See notes
5 and 8 supra, and accompanying text.
27. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1476 (1870) : "A minor under sixteen years can not
dispose of any property, save, however, the dispositions contained in the ninth
chapter of this title."
Id. art. 1477: "The minor above sixteen can dispose only mortis causa (in
prospect of death)."
28. See Johnson v. Aldin, 15 La. Ann. 505 (1860).
29. Ibid.
30. Commissioner v. Allen, 108 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 680 (1940), noted in 53 HAIv. L. REV. 690 (1940), 88 U. PA. L. REV.
631 (1940) ; cf. Brandeis, State Gift Taxes - Their Relation to Death Taxes,
26 IOWA L. REV. 479, 488-89 (1941).
31. The difficulty with this opinion is that the circuit court failed to continue
its own logic. See 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 16.04 (1942).
In answering the contention that the varying periods allowed for disaffirmance
would cause administrative hardships, the court denied there was any difficulty
[Vol. XXVI
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nated by death, the property transferred by the gift would ap-
pear to be included in the gross estate of the donor.32  However,
we have seen that a contrary result was reached in the Safe
Deposit case where the court thought that the likelihood of
revocation was remote. In the event they were both followed,
then a gift with a power to revoke reserved by operation of law
would not be a taxable transfer under either tax. The Allen and
Safe Deposit cases were decided by different circuits, and the
cases may represent irreconcilable interpretations of the effect
of voidable gifts in the federal tax statutes.
In Louisiana an unemancipated minor lacks authority to ac-
cept any donation other than a manual gift.3  Donations may
be accepted by the minor's tutor, his parents, or by other legiti-
mate ascendants; but until the donation is accepted by one of
those persons or by the minor upon reaching majority, the donor
has the power to revoke the gift.3 4 As long as the power to
revoke remains, the inter vivos donation would not be complete,
and thus not subject to the gift tax. If the donor dies before
the acceptance, the property would certainly appear includible
in the present case and observed, in addition, that the running of the state statute
of limitations had completely barred any possible disaffirmance. Yet the court
upheld the Commissioner's assessment of the gift tax as of the date that the
settlor reached majority, although at that time the power to recall the gift was
apparently still potent. Under the New Jersey law the power had expired in
1939, according to the court, 108 F.2d at 966. The date was convenient for
administrative purposes, but it fails to correspond with the reasoning of the
court, which emphasizes the moment of time the power to disaffirm is lost.
Cf. Paul, Debt and Basis Reduction Under the Chandler Act, 15 TUL. L. REv. 1,
13 (1940), to the effect that the argument of administrative convenience may
cover a multitude of legislative sins. It may also account for interpretation sins.
The court suggested that the Commissioner may obviate administrative hard-
ship by promulgating regulations fully protecting the infant's right of disaffirm-
ance. However, if state law were in conflict with the regulations, the tax might
still be imposed at a time when the right to recall the property was still out-
standing. Cf. Note, 53 H.iiv. L. REv. 690, 691 (1940). However, by the time
the circuit court rendered the decision the period allowed by disaffirmance under
state law had expired. It has been suggested by one commentator that the Allen
decision is persuasive in light of Congress' apparent failure to legislate a gift
tax section with reference to voidable donations. This same commentator also
generalized the Allen decision to the following: "A transfer fully enforceable as
between the respective parties constitutes a taxable gift, irrespective of the rights
of special classes to intervene." 2 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION
§ 16.04 (1942).
32. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038.
33. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1546 (1870).
34. Ibid. See Williams v. Horn, 170 La. 663, 129 So. 122 (1930). In fact,
it might be said that any donation inter vivos is revocable until accepted by
the donee, because it is not binding upon the donor until such acceptance is made.
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1540 (1870). The problem is made more dramatic by the
time element in the case of minors. But see id. art. 1541: "Yet, if the donation
has been executed, that is, if the donee has been put by the donor into corporeal
possession of the effects given, the donation, though not accepted in express
terms, has full effects."
1965].
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in the donor's gross estate for estate tax purposes under the
language of section 2038.-3 It is possible, nonetheless, that the
"practical mind"3 6 would prevent inclusion where it is clear that
revocation was far from the donor's intentions.
Fraud
A donor can revoke a donation for fraud; however, if he has
not moved to set it aside, then the subtle ramifications to be
drawn from the doctrine of ratification would be applicable.
Administratively, a tax collection system might not be capable
of incorporating such a subtle standard. 7 Analytically, revo-
cability of a donation induced by fraud is similar to revocation
by insanity and minority and should be treated the same. The
applicable Louisiana rights and procedures3 8 would probably not
produce a result different from the common law counterpart.
Community Property
The Texas community property system has provoked gift
and estate tax suits concerning the result of the power to revoke
inter vivos donations.39 These cases deal with a donation of com-
munity property by the husband with or without the consent
of the wife. When the husband had made a donation of com-
munity property without the wife's consent, and she had not
had the donation set aside, the value of her share of the prop-
erty donated was held included in her estate. 40 The court rea-
soned that, until the wife's death, she could have set aside the
donation on possible grounds of fraud, and thus the wife's share
of the donation took effect when her power was terminated at
death. The court said, however, that if the husband had been
able to show that there were absolutely no grounds to rescind
the donation for fraud, his wife's share of the property would
not have been included in her estate.4 1 Thus the burden was
placed on the husband to prove that the wife's share of the com-
35. See note 15 supra, and accompanying text.
36. See discussion of Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Tait, 54 F.2d 383 (D. Md.
1931), 3 F. Supp. 51 (D. Md. 1933), afj'd, 70 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1934) in note
19 supra, accompanying text.
37. As to the relevance of administrative considerations, see Helvering v. Mid-
land Mut. Life Ins. Co., 300 U.S. 216 (1937).
38. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1819, 1847, 1849, 1881, 1882 (1870).
39. Estate of Lucey v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 1010 (1949) ; Francis v. Com-
missioner, 8 T.C. 822 (1947); Fleming v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 974, aff'd on
other issues, 155 F.2d 204 (5th Cir. 1946).
40. Estate of Lucey, 13 T.C. 1010 (1949).
41. Id. at 1017.
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inunity property donated without her consent was not includible
in her estate. The court reached this result on the basis of dicta
in the Francis case42 which held the total gift to be complete if
both spouses consented.
In Louisiana, as in Texas, the husband is prohibited from
donating or fraudulently disposing of the community's immov-
able property.4  Though the right of action under Louisiana
law is different from the right of action in Texas since it places
the burden of proof on the wife,44 the important distinguishing
feature of the Louisiana provisions is that the wife does not
have a power of revocation, as in Texas, but merely a suit
against the husband's estate for damages.45 As to the wife, the
economic results of the Texas and Louisiana procedures are
substantially the same: the wife receives either the property or
its value via a cause of action predicated on the theory of fraud.
Under Texas law, the donee might be required to relinquish
one-half of the donation, but the husband loses nothing; under
Louisiana law, however, the whole donation stands and the hus-
band's estate is liable to the wife for half its value. Thus in
Louisiana the only property to be included in the wife's estate
is the value of her cause of action against the husband.
Article 1749 of the Louisiana Civil Code, now repealed, 46
contained a provision that all inter-spousal donations remained
42. Francis v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 822 (1947). However, where the spouses
consented to the donation to a trust, of which the husband was the trustee with
full discretionary powers, the gift was held to be complete only to the extent of
the wife's portion. Fleming v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 974, aff'd on other issues,
155 F. 2d 204 (5th Cir. 1946).
43. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870) : "The husband is the head and master
of the partnership or community of gains; he administers the effects, disposes
of the revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an onerous title
without the consent and permission of his wife.
"He can make no conveyance inter vivos, by gratuitous title, of the im-
movables of the community, nor of the whole, or of a quota of the movables,
unless it be for the establishment of the children of the marriage. A gratuitous
title within the contemplation of this article embraces all titles wherein there is
no direct, material advantage to the donor.
"Nevertheless he may dispose of the movable effects by a gratuitous and par-
ticular title, to the benefit of all persons.
"But if it should be proved that the husband has sold the common property,
or otherwise disposed of the same by fraud to the injury of his wife, she may
have her action against the heirs of her husband, in support of her claim in
one-half of the property, on her satisfactorily proving the fraud."
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Id. art. 1749, repealed, La. Acts 1942, No. 187: "All donations made
between married persons during marriage, though termed inter vivos, shall always
be revocable.
"The revocation may be made by the wife, without her being authorized to
that effect by her husband, or by a court of justice."
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revocable by the donor. The Fifth Circuit held that this made
any inter-spousal donation incomplete for estate tax purposes47
because: (1) This was an absolute right of revocation, not con-
tingent on the happening of any event; and (2) it was im-
material whether the power was expressly reserved by the donor
or provided for by law. The taxpayers in that suit contended
that everything in their power had been done to make the gift
complete, 48 but the court countered that, even if a taxpayer does
all he can to make an irrevocable gift, if the gift remains revo-
cable upon the exercise of a power vested in the donor by opera-
tion of law, the gift is still to be considered as revocable for
estate and gift tax purposes. Though the repeal of the article
avoids this problem with regard to inter-spousal donations, the
case gives valuable insight into how the court will reason in
analogous situations.
If the right to revoke is solely in a third party, there is a
completed gift because the test is the giving up of all control
by the donor and thus such a right to revoke clearly has no value
to the estate. Litigated situations include donations set aside by
creditors49 or by a subsequent transferee because of non-recorda-
tion.50 However, in cases where the estate may set aside the
transfer, there is a valuable cause of action which exists in favor
of the estate which should be included to the extent of its value.5'
If the purported transfer, such as a simulation, is void under
state law, as opposed to voidable, the transfer should be dis-
regarded completely in computing estate and gift tax liability.52
47. Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1942).
48. The taxpayers' argument was based on Weil v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d
561, 563 (5th Cir. 1936).
49. McCann v. Commissioner, 87 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1937) ; Logan v. Denman,
15 AFTR 791, 323 CCHI Fed. Tax Serv., 9436 (N.D. Ohio 1932), appeals dis-
missed, 63 F.2d 999, 1008 (6th Cir. 1933) ; Estate of Gilis, BTA Memo. Op.,
May 8, 1939, CCH Dec. 10,081-C; Estate of Murfey, BTA Memo. Op., March 18,
1941, CCH Dec. 11,731-D; LOWNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES § 16.04 (1962); 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 406
(1942).
50. Cf. Rose v. Commissioner, 65 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1933).
51. See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION § 4.06 (1942); cf.
Commissioner v. Waterbury, 97 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305 U.S.
638 (1938) ; Higgins v. White, 93 F.2d 357 (1st Cir. 1937).
52. Kirkpatrick v. Sanders, 261 F.2d 480 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1000 (1959); Barbara F. Thompson, P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC.
1959-183; cf. George L. Elliot, 23 B.T.A. 354 (1931) ; Williams P. Metcalf,
7 T.C. 153 (1946), affd, 47-2 U.S.T.C. § 10,566 (6th Cir. 1947) ; Smith v. Com-
missioner, 140 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Logan v. Denman, 15 F.A.T.R. 791
(N.D. Ohio 1932), appeal dismissed, 63 F.2d 999, 1008 (6th Cir. 1933) ; Cahn,
LOCAL LAW IN FEDERAL TAXATION, 52 YALE L.J. 799, 820 (1943).
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Trust Situationw
There is an analogy between the powers which may be vested
in trustees at common law, and the powers granted Louisiana
forced heirs by the provisions of the Civil Code. Therefore, the
cases in the gift and estate tax field involving transfers to trusts
have developed rules that are useful in analyzing the possible
results of the provisions of Louisiana law relative to donations
inter vivos. The Internal Revenue Code provides skeleton rules
for estate tax applicable to donations outright or in trust in
which the donor has so conditioned his donation that (1) the
transfer takes effect only at his death;53 or (2) the decedent-
donor alone, or in conjunction with any other person, has the
power, as of the death of the donor "to alter, amend, revoke, or
terminate" a transfer. 54
In addition, the value of property donated is included in the
donor's estate if the decedent has retained a reversionary inter-
est in the property and the value of this interest immediately
before his death exceeds five percent5 5 of the value of the prop-
erty. In this context the term "reversionary interest" includes
a possibility that the property transferred by the decedent may
either return to him, to his estate, or be subject to his power of
disposition. 56
The Supreme Court has held that it will look to the economic
results of a transfer to determine whether the interest is rever-
sionary. 57 If upon examination the results are found tantamount
to a retained interest, the court will not distinguish because of
conveyancing law technicalities.5 8 Furthermore, no distinctions
for tax purposes will be made between trust and non-trust situa-
tions5 9 or between the return to the donor by operation of law
53. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037.
54. Id. § 2038.
55. A provision first added to the tax law 'by the Technical Changes Act of
1949, § 7; 63 Stat. 891 (1949).
56. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037(b) (Special Rules).
57. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940), overruling Helvering v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935) ; Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust
Co.. 296 U.S. 48 (1935). See LOWNDES & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES 80-98 (1962), for a full discussion of the development.
58. See Goldstone v. United States, 325 U.S. 687 (1945) ; Helvering v. Clif-
ford, 309 U.S. 106 (1940) ; Klein v. United States, 283 U.S. 231 (1931) ; accord,
Commissioner v. Singer, 161 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1947); Lloyd's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 141 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Graff v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 247
(7th Cir. 1941).
59. See, e.g., Graff v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1941). For cases
that had previously distinguished between trust and non-trust situations see, e.g.,
Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935) ; Becker v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 48 (1935).
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or by specific reservation6 If the possibility that the property
would revest in the donor is so "remote" that for all practical
purposes there is no "tie to bind the property to the donor's
estate," the interest has been held not to fall within the inclusion
rule of the court.61
Historically, the inclusion in the gross estate of the interest
retained in these cases came under the "retained interest" sec-
tion,62 but the regulations imply use now of the "power to
amend" section. 3 The choice of sections used is important since
retained interest is conditioned by the five percent provision
which would cover remoteness of time or contingency; whereas
the power to amend is not statutorily subject to such a restric-
tion.64 Thus if the government is using the "power to amend"
60. See Estate of Speigel v. Commissioner, 335 U.S. 701 (1949).
61. See Frances Biddle Trust, 3 T.C. 839 (1944) ; Estate of Goodyear, 2 T.C.
885 (1943). For an excellent discussion of the area see Pedrick, Grantor Powers
and Estate Taxation: The Ties That Bind, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 527 (1959).
62. See Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339 (1929) (power reserved
by the decedent grantor alone was sufficient for the imposition of the estate tax
under antecedent to INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2037).
63. Fed. Tax Regs. § 20.2038: "(a) In General. - The value of the gross
estate shall include the value of all property (except real property outside the
United States) - - -
"(1) Transfers After June 22, 1936-To the extent of any interest therein
of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case of a bona
fide sale for an adequate consideration in money or money's worth), by trust
or otherwise,...
"1 Revocable Transfers- (a) In General- A decedent's gross estate includes
under section 2038 the value of any interest in property transferred 'by the
decedent, whether in trust or otherwise, if the enjoyment of the interest was
subject at the date of the decedent's death to any change through the exercise
of a power by the decedent to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate, or if the dece-
dent relinquished such power in contemplation of death. However, section 2038
does not apply . ..
"(1) To the extent that the transfer was for an adequate and full considera- *
tion in money or money's worth (see § 20.2043-1) ;
"(2) If the decedent's power could be exercised only with the consent of
all parties having an interest (vested or contingent) in the transferred property,
and if the power adds nothing to the rights of the parties under local law; or
"(3) To a power held solely by a person other than the decedent. But, for
example, if the decedent had the unrestricted power to remove or discharge a
trustee at any time and appoint himself trustee, the decedent is considered as
having the powers of the trustee. However, this result would not follow if he
only fad the power to appoint himself trustee under limited conditions which did
not exist at the time of his death . .. .
64. But ci. id. 2038-1(b) : "Date of existence of power. A power to alter,
amend, revoke, or terminate will be considered to have existed at the date of the
decedent's death even though the exercise of the power was subject to a precedent
giving of notice or even though the alteration, amendment, revocation or termi-
nation would have taken effect only on the expiration of a stated period after the
exercise of the power, whether or not on or before the date of the decedent's
death notice had been given or the power exercised. In determining the value
of the gross estate in such cases, the full value of the property transferred sub-
ject to the power is discounted for the period required to elapse between the date
of decedent's death and the date upon which the alteration, amendment, revoca-
tion, or termination could take effect. In this connection, see especially § 20.2031-7.
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section as the basis of its suit, the taxpayer is left in the pre-
carious position of having to employ language from cases brought
under the predecessor of "the retained interest" section of the
present Code.
It should be noted, in addition, that the power to "amend,
revoke, or terminate" has almost always been extended to the
fullest possible scope 6' so that any power to change the relation-
ship of the original parties to the donation, 68 to revoke par-
tially,67 to accelerate or withhold distribution of the corpus of
a trust68 has been held to fall within the scope of the section.
However, the Treasury Department has lessened the impact
of this view somewhat by the self-imposed restriction in making
contingent powers non-taxable if the contingency has not oc-
curred as of the date of decedent's death.69 Furthermore a cir-
cuit court of appeals decision 70 held that a donor may retain
powers of distribution and allocation among beneficiaries with-
out subjecting the gift to estate tax. The criterion is that the
power must be exercisable only in accordance with a predeter-
mined, fixed standard. The rationale of the rule is that if the
standard is reasonable, the distribution and allocation would be
merely a ministerial act, and a court of equity could enforce
the standard. However, this circuit court decision should be
discounted since the Supreme Court cases interpreting section
2038 have extended this section to the fullest possible limits.7 '
In considering the gift tax, the key to exclusion from the tax
is the reservation by the donor of any "string" to the gift and
the gift becomes taxable only on the release of all "strings" by
the donor. Similar problems as to what constitutes a "string"
exist in gift taxation as in estate taxation, but the litigation of
However, section 2038 is not applicable to a power the exercise of which was
subject to a contingency beyond the decedent's control which did not occur before
his death (e.g., the death of another person during the decedent's life). See,
however, section 2036(a) (2) for the inclusion of property in the decedent's gross
estate on account of such power."
65. See Pedrick, Grantor Powers and Estate Taxation: The Ties That Bind,
54 Nw. U.L. REV. 527, 538 (1959).
66. Porter v. Commissioner, 288 U.S. 436 (1933).
67. Estate of Gramm, 17 T.C. 1063 (1951).
68. Lober v. United States, 346 U.S. 335 (1953).
69. Fed. Tax Regs. § 20.2038-1(b) ; see Helvering v. Tetzlaff, 141 F.2d 8 (8th
Cir. 1944).
70. Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1947).
71. See Pedrick, Grantor Powers and Estate Tawation: The Ties That Bind,
54 Nw. U.L. REV. 527, 537 (1959).
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the former cases has been sparse, and for the most part unen-
lightening.7 2
If the grantor's reacquisition of the trust corpus is dependent
upon the lone exercise of another's discretion, the "adverse" or
"nonadverse" character of the other person's interest in the prop-
erty becomes important in determining whether there is a gift.
Though the Code defines the terms, the delineation of persons
"adverse" and "nonadverse" has not been clearly drawn.7 3 Gen-
erally a person is "nonadverse" if he loses no economic ad-
vantage by following the dictates or wishes of the donor or if
by his relationship with the donor he is susceptible to carrying
out the donor's wishes through persuasion. 74 If the power holder
is "nonadverse," then the "string" is tantamount to being held
by the donor and the gift will not be subject to gift tax.75 In
situations in which the "string" holder is "adverse," the donor
seems to have cast away the binding element sufficiently to
constitute a complete transfer without regard to whether the
donee is now holding all the strings.76 The estate tax provision
is inconsistent with the gift tax rule; even though a donation
is subject to the powers "to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate"
lodged in a third party, whether "adverse" 77 or "nonadverse,"'
the property is not included in the gross estate of the donor
decedent. This rule has developed because the estate tax con-
tains no provision for the taxation of a donation to which a
72. See 4 RABKIN & JOUNSON, FEDERAL INCOME GIFT AND ESTATE TAXA-
TION § 58.09.
73. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 672: "(a) ADVERSE PARTY. - For purposes of
this subpart, the term 'adverse party' means any person having a substantial
beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise
or non-exercise of the power which he possesses respecting the trust.
"(b) NONADVERSE PARTY. - For purposes of this subpart, the term 'non-
adverse party' means any person who is not an adverse party."
The "substantial" requirement is as elusive as "adverse" itself. "Substantial"
has, however, been held to make ineffective any interest which is too contingent
or remote or which is too small in relation to the size of the trust. Mary A.
Cushing, 38 B.T.A. 948 (1939).
74. Ibid.; see Commissioner v. Vander Weele, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958),
aff'g 27 T.C. 340 (1956) ; Estate of Gramm, 17 T.C. 1063 (1951), acquiesced
in by Treas. Dept. Rev. Rul. 62-13, 1962-2- CuM. BULL. 180.
75. But cf. Fed. Tax Regs. § 25.2511-2(b) where nonadverse trustee's discre-
tion is subject to a fixed or ascertainable standard, which is supported by Albert
D. Lasker, 1 T.C. 208 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, 138 F.2d 989 (7th Cir.
1943) ; see Herzog v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 237 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied,
317 U.S. 658 (1942).
76. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933).
77. Commissioner v. Dravo, 119 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1941) ; Anna B. Kneeland,
34 B.T.A* 816 (1936).
78. Hugh M. Beuler Trust, 2 T.C. 1052, aff'd sub nom., Commissioner v.
Irving Trust Co., 147 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Herzog v. Commissioner, 116
F.2d 591 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Lester Hofheimer Estate, 2 T.C. 773 (1943), rev'd
on other grounds, 149 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945).
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power of revocation exists only in one other than the deceased
donor. 9 It is obviously incongruous that the reservation of a
power of passive acquiescence in a revestment s° should be non-
taxable, while the reservation of a power by express consent to
such revestment s' should be taxable, but the rule seems to be so
formulated.8 2 Thus it is possible that there is an inconsistency
which allows a donation subject to powers held by "nonadverse"
persons not to be taxable either under the estate or the gift tax,
and thus a donor can hold the "string" without being caught
"holding the whole bag."
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF THE LOUISIANA STIPULATIONS
The federal gift and estate tax effects of the Louisiana provi-
sions discussed under this section have not been litigated. The
purpose of this section will be to analyze the gift and estate
tax aspects of the possible revocation of inter vivos donations
in Louisiana.
Powers of Forced Heirss
In Louisiana, the children of the deceased, or the parents of
the deceased if he died without issue, are forced heirs.8 There
79. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2038 (a) (1), quoted in text accompanying
note 15 supra. It has been held that sections 2037 and 2038 are not the basis
of a tax on this type transfer. See Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U.S. 339
(1929) ; Helvering v. City Bank Farmer's Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85 (1935).
80. E.g., where the donor provides for an adverse trustee who has power to
revest the donor with the corpus of the trust.
81. E.g., where the power to revest corpus is in the donor by specific reser-
vation.
82. Fed. Tax Regs. § 20.2038-1(a) (3).
83. Forced heirship is an institution unique to Louisiana and therefore the
powers vested in the forced heirs have no counterpart at common law. See Com-
ments, 38 TuL. L. REV. 372 (1964), 37 TiL. L. REV. 710 (1963). LA. CONST. art.
IV, § 16, prohibits the abolition of forced heirship.
84. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1493 (1870) : "Donations inter vivos or mortis causa
can not exceed two-thirds of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his
decease, a legitimate child; one-half if he leaves two children; and one-third, if
he leaves three or a greater number.
"Under the name children are included descendants of whatever degree they
be, it being understood that they are only counted for the child they represent."
Id. art. 1494: "Donations inter vivos or mortis causa can not exceed two-
thirds of the property, if the disposer, having no children, leaves a father, mother,
or 'both, provided that where the legal portion of the surviving father, mother
or both is less than one-third the forced portion shall not be increased to one-
third, but shall remain at the legal portion."
- Id. art. 1495: "In the cases prescribed by the last two preceding articles,
the heirs are called forced heirs, because the donor can not deprive them.of..the
portion of his estate reserved to them by law, except in cases where he has a just
cause to disinherit them."
There are, however, no reported cases dealing with parents as forced heirs
in an action for collation.
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are a number of actions that can be brought by forced heirs,
including the action to demand collation,85 the action to reduce
excessive donations,88 and the action to declare a simulation. 7
A. Collation.8 The purpose of collation is to establish
equality among the descendant forced heirs who come to the
succession of their ancestor. 89 Collation is based on the assump-
tion that an ancestor wishes to deal equally with his descendant
forced heirs.9 0 Therefore, if a person gives one of his forced
heirs a donation, it is assumed to be an advancement d'hoirie,
an advance on the share the donee will receive at the donor's
death."' Unless the donor's intention to favor the donee with an
extra portion has been formally evidenced, as prescribed by the
Civil Code, or the donation was a manual gift,9 2 the donee's co-
heirs can require him to collate this donation received from the
ancestor if the donee wishes to share in the estate of the an-
cestor.9 3 Collation is a procedure, then, whereby these donations
are returned to the mass of the succession.9 4 The return may
be accomplished by actual return of the property to the mass
of the succession 95 or taking a reduced amount from the succes-
sion; in the latter case the reduction corresponds to the value
of the donation. 6 The right to demand collation is reserved to
forced heirs, and it cannot be demanded by any other heir or
by the legatees or creditors of the succession to which the colla-
tion is due.9 7
If the donor does not at the time of the donation state in the
required manner that the donation to a forced heir is meant as
an advantage or extra portion, he may still do so at a later
time.98 As long as the donor does not exercise his option to
85. See id. arts. 1227-1288.
86. Id. arts. 1502-1518.
87. Id. art. 2239.
88. Collations will be dealt with only in regard to the gift and estate tax
aspects. For a full discussion of the action for and problems of collation, see
Comment, 26 TUL. L. REV. 203 (1952).
89. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1229 (1870) ; see Doll v. Doll, 206 La. 550, 560,
19 So. 2d 249, 252 (1944) ; Bethelot v. Fitch, 44 La. Ann. 503, 10 So. 867 (1892);
Benoit v. Benoit's Heirs, 8 La. 228, 230 (1835).
90. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1229 (1870) ; CROSS, LOUISIANA SUCCESSIONS 5 92
(1891).
91. See note 90 supra.
92. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1231-1233 (1870).
93. See id. art. 1237.
94. Id. art. 1229; see Oppenheim, An Introduction to the Louisiana Law of
Successions, 4 L.S.A. -LA. CIVIL CODE 1, 70 (West ed. 1952).
95. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1251, 1252.
96. Id. arts. 1251, 1253.
97. Id. arts. 1235, 1236.
96. Id. art. 1232.
[Vol. XXVI
COMMENTS
bestow an extra portion on the forced heirs, the donated prop-
erty has been considered not severed from the donor's estate."9
Severance does not come until partition, when the donated prop-
erty is classified as an absolute donation or as an advancement
of inheritance. 1°° By merely analyzing the legal consequences,
it could be argued that the gifts fit within the Internal Revenue
Code provisions including in the donor's estate a gift subject to
power to amend.' 10 As was seen in the summary of the tax law,
the jurisprudence has construed section 2038 to include any
power to change the relationship of the parties, as well as to
accelerate the distribution. 0 2 With these interpretations of sec-
tion 2038, the power to make the gift absolute retained by the
donor seems to be within the scope of the section's inclusions.
Upon economic analysis, however, collation becomes like
transactions that have been held not to cause inclusion. When
collation takes place, the donor is not revested with the donation;
the heirs of the donee are the only ones who can possibly benefit.
In addition, collation is only to establish equality among the
forced heirs who come to the succession of their ancestor. Thus
if all the forced heirs come to the succession in equal standing,
no action for collation would lie, even though there had been
donations inter vivos. Therefore collation is at most a con-
tingent power, and hence it should not cause inclusion of the
donation in the donor's gross estate, because no event has
occurred to cause the property to return to the estate of the
donor. 10 3 The forced heir who has received more than his share,
without it being stated as an advantage, may renounce the suc-
cession and not be subject to a suit for collation by his co-heirs. 04
This renunciation does not, however, absolve this heir from
collating an excessive donation in an action for reduction, for
such an action can be brought even if the donee is a stranger to
the succession. 0 5
From the gift tax aspect, the retention of the power in the
donor to make the gift an extra portion, or more so, the concept
of advancement d'hoirie should prevent the gift from being sub-
ject to the gift tax under the "tie that binds" rule. The applica-
99. LeBlanc v. Volker, 198 So. 398 (La. App. Or. Cir. 1940); Cuoss, Lou-
ISIANA SUCCESSIONS § 310 (1891).
100. See note 99 supra.
101. See INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 2038.
102. See notes 65-69 supra, and accompanying text.
103. See Fed. Tax Regs. § 20.2038-1(b).
104. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1237 (1870).
105. Id. arts. 1231, 1237.
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tion of the economic approach, however, would produce a com-
pleted transfer as was found under the estate tax discussion.
The strength of the argument for inclusion available to the
government suggests the desirability of avoiding the issue. This
can be easily accomplished by an indication by the donor that
the donation was meant as an advantage or an extra portion.
The gift is then so clearly complete as to be beyond debate.
B. Reduction.10 6 Under Louisiana law a donor is prohibited
from disposing of a certain percentage of his property, the
forced portion or legitime; the amount of the legitime varies
according to the number and relationship of his forced heirs.107
Upon the death of the donor, all the property owned by the
donor at that time is aggregated with the donations made dur-
ing his lifetime. From this aggregate the debts of the estate
are subtracted, and the net amount thus computed is used in
determining whether there has been an encroachment upon the
legitime. 05 When the prohibition is found to have been violated,
the basic remedy available to the forced heir is the action of
reduction, which has for its sole purpose the reducing of the
deceased's donations, whether to forced heirs or not, to the
extent necessary to reinstate the appropriate percentage of the
estate for the legitime.109 Th action of reduction, however, can
be brought only after the death of the donor; thus all inter vivos
gifts retain their full effect during the donor's lifetime.1 0 The
necessary result of these provisions is that the action is con-
tingent upon the percentage requirement not being met at the
time of the donor's death"' and upon the forced heirs surviving
the donor.1 12 The power to revoke or revoke partially is held
by third parties to the donation. Hence, since the power "to
amend, alter, revoke, or terminate" is in a third party, the prop-
erty would not be included in the gross estate of the deceased
for estate tax purposes. As for the gift tax, the "adverse" or
"nonadverse" characterization of the forced heirs must be deter-
mined. 18 This cannot be accomplished at the time of the dona-
106. Reduction will only 'be discussed as to the effects such an action has
on the federal gift and estate tax. For a full discussion of the action and the
problems pertaining thereto, see Comment, 38 TUL. L. REV. 372 (1964).
107. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1493-1495 (1870), quoted in note 84 supra.
108. For a detailed description of this calculation see Succession of Gomez,
226 La. 1092, 78 So. 2d 411 (1955) ; Note, 29 TuL. L. REV. 803 (1955).
109. See LA. CIVIL CoDE arts. 1495, 1515 (1870).
110. Id. art. 1507.
111. Id. art. 1505.
112. Id. art. 1504.
113. See INT. REV. CoDE of 1954, § 672(a) and (b), quoted in note 73 supra.
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tion because the existence and number of the forced heirs cannot
be determined until a later time, upon the death of the donor.
C. Revocation of Simulated Transfers.14 Simulation is a
broad term which includes a variety of transactions by which
the parties involved attempt to make it appear that they have
entered into one agreement when in fact they have entered into
another, or none at all." 5
In attacking a simulation, the creditors of the transferor
clearly stand in a better position than the transferor himself:
they can attack his simulations by any available evidence" 6
whereas the transferor must produce a counterletter or its
equivalent." 7 On the other hand, it is also clear that the ordi-
nary heirs or universal successors of the supposed transferor
stand in the shoes of the transferor and are subject to the same
requirements as the transferor himself."8 The position of the
forced heirs is somewhere between that of a creditor and an
ordinary heir."19 The forced heirs' claim for the legitime is, in
effect, a claim against the supposed transferor, now deceased,
which gives them a status analogous to that of creditors; but
after the forced heirs have received their forced portion their
status is more like that of ordinary heirs. 20 In order to analyze
further the economic consequences of the varying rights of the
forced heirs, it is necessary to distinguish between non-transfer
simulations and disguised-transfer simulations.
In non-transfer simulations, the supposed transferor actually
has no intention to part with ownership at all, and the supposed
transferee does not pay the recited purchase price. However,
the true intentions and facts are kept secret and it appears as
a matter of form that an ordinary transfer has taken place.
Upon the donor's death, and the discovery of the simulation,
the value of the property would be fictitiously added to the
mass of the supposed transferor's succession. If after the proper
114. The law of simulation is fraught with technicalities and distinctions.
The author acknowledges his indebtedness to the deft analysis found in Lemann,
Some Aspects of Simulation in France and Louisiana, 29 TuL. L. REv. 22 (1954).
115. Ibid.
116. See Lawson v. McBride, 121 La. 282, 46 So. 312 (1908) (action in dec-
laration of simulation is imprescriptible) ; Testart v. Beloit, 31 La. Ann. 795
(1879) (unnecessary to be a creditor at time of simulation to attack).
117. Sherman v. Nehig, 154 La. 25, 97 So. 270 (1923) ; Godwin v. Neustadt,
42 La. Ann. 735, 7 So. 744 (1890) ; Cary v. Richardson, 35 La. Ann. 505 (1883)
Badon v. Badon, 4 La. 166 (1832).
118. See McGee v. Finley, 65 So. 2d 384 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1953).
119. See LA. CrvIL CODE arts. 1502-1518 (1870).
120. See Lemann, Some Aapect8 of Simulations in France and Louiaiaosa, 29
TuL. L. REv. 22 (1954).
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calculations, the property of the simulation were found to form
part of the legitime, the heirs could attack it with the rights of
creditors. If the property were not found to be part of the
legitime, the forced heirs would have to meet the evidentiary
requirements imposed on ordinary heirs. In either case, a suc-
cessful action results in establishing the nullity of the supposed
transfer. As would be true for common law nullities, the trans-
fer should have no effect on the estate or gift tax for no transfer
has been accomplished. 12 1
The disguised-transfer simulation usually arises when the
true intention of the parties is to execute a donation, but, in-
stead, they execute an act of sale, valid on its face. Here, the
parties actually intend that the ownership of the property pass,
but have no intention that the recited price be paid. Simulations
attacked by forced heirs have in most cases involved disguised-
transfer simulations because this type of transfer is frequently
used to conceal a donation to a favored child above and beyond
the disposable portion, or to a person not permitted to receive a
donation.1 22 If the transfer was in fact a donation to a child,
then the other forced heirs can invoke article 2444123 and the
collation rules to annul the disguised donation entirely without
regard to the legitime. 1 24 Under such circumstances the tax
position discussed in connection with collation would apply: the
property is simply treated as part of the transferor's estate.
If the transferee is someone incapable of receiving from the
donor, 125 then the donation is subject to attack by any inter-
ested person. Because it is void, this type of transfer is not
subject to the gift tax and the property is included in the gross
estate of the deceased donor.
Where the disguised donation was not made to an heir or to
a person incapable of receiving, the transfer can still be revealed
121. See note 52 supra.
122. A pretended transfer would not take the actual possession of the prop-
erty out of the estate. A secret transfer, on the other hand, would divest the
estate of the property in such a manner that the transfer would not be added
back to the mass of the succession for the calculating of the lcgitime.
123. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 2444 (1870) : "'Te sales of immovable property
made by parents to their children, may be attacked by the forced heirs, as con-
taining a donation in disguise, if the latter can prove that no price has been
paid, or that the price was below one-fourth of the real value of the immovable
sold, at the time of the sale."
124. Id. arts. 1502-1518.
125. See id. art. 1481 (concubines) ; art. 1479 (minor's gift to tutors) ; art.
1483 (gift to natural children or acknowledged illegitimate children) ; art. 1488
(adulterine or incestuous children) ; art. 1489 (patients to doctors). See also id.
art. 1497 (donation omnium bonorium).
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as a donation. After a donation is uncovered, however, the
forced heirs have no right to attack it unless the donation im-
pinges upon their legitime. The attack to cure impingement
would arise under the rights of forced heirs to reduce excessive
donations and would be subject to the same estate tax analysis
as was that action.
Powers in the Donor under Article 1559
Under Louisiana law, a donor who is a major and of sound
mind at the time of the donation is not ordinarily allowed to
revoke his donation. Among the exceptions to the general rule
of irrevocability are those provided by the four parts of article
1559: ingratitude, non-fulfillment of the eventual conditions,
non-performance of the conditions imposed on the donee, and
the legal or conventional return.12
As to ingratitude and the non-fulfillment or non-performance
of conditions, the Civil Code makes the exercise of the power to
revoke contingent upon the occurrence of these acts. The regula-
tions of the Treasury Department state that if a contingent
power has not vested by the time the donor dies, the donated
property will not be considered part of the donor's estate.127
This regulation certainly seems applicable to the economic situa-
tion created by the conditions of article 1559. Analogous to
article 1559 is article 156, which prcvides for the loss of dona-
tions by a spouse who has a judgment for separation or divorce
for fault declared against him. 128 Seemingly, contingent powers
of articles 1559 and 156 would also not prevent a donation from
being complete for gift tax purposes, for at the time of the dona-
tion no one is "holding any strings."
If, however, a power originally contingent has vested by the
happening of one of the events provided in article 1559 or 156,
126. Id. art. 1559: "Donaitons inter vivos are liable to be revoked or dissolved
on account of the following causes:
"1. The ingratitude of the donee;
"2. The non-fulfillment of the eventual conditions, which suspend their con-
summation ;
"3. The non-performance of the conditions imposed on the donee;
"4. The legal or conventional return."
127. Fed. Tax Regs. § 20.2038-1(b), quoted note 64 supra.
128. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 156 (1870) : "In case of separation from bed and
board, the party against whom it shall have been pronounced, shall lose all the
advantages or donations, the other party may have conferred by the marriage
contract or since, and the party at whose instance the separation has been ob-
tained, shall preserve all those to which such party would have been entitled;
and these dispositions are to take place even in case the advantages and donations
were reciprocally made.
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and the donor dies before the action to revoke is prescribed, the
property should be includible in the gross estate under section
2038. If the donor does not wish to revoke the gift, he should
formally relinquish his power to do so.
In legal or conventional revocation 129 the donor and donee
agree that the donation should be revoked. This revocation is
valid even should the donor agree to sell the property and donate
the proceeds to the donee. 130 In addition, if the donor joins in
warranting the title, the Supreme Court of Louisiana has held
there is a tacit revocation.'-' Such conventional revocations be-
come necessary for the donee to convey a merchantable title to
donated immovable property since the forced heirs can pursue
such property to satisfy their legitime . 8 2 Helvering v. Helm-
holz'3 3 held that a revocation by the consent of all the parties
does not constitute a power in the donor or the donor and others
within the meaning of section 2038. Nonetheless, it has been
suggested that the retention by operation of law of the Louisiana
power is tantamount to the donor retaining practical control
over the alienation by the donee of a donated immovable.3 4
It was speculated that such a power could be within the scope
of section 2038, thus making all donations of immovable prop-
erty includible in the donor's estate for estate tax purposes. 35
Such a suggestion, however, tends to over-emphasize the strength
of the donor's power. Helmholz was based directly upon the
characterization of the interest of the trust beneficiary whose
consent was also required, as "adverse." It is submitted that
the interest of the donee in Louisiana is as "adverse" as the
interest of the beneficiary in Helmholz. 86 It should also be
realized that only the donor will be in a position of power where
the donee wishes to sell the donated immovable. In addition, the
defect in the merchantable title can be cured by time and even in
cases where the defect is still potent, the donee can sell the
property by discounting the contingent power of the forced
heirs.
129. Id. art. 1559(4).
130. Scudder v. Howe, 44 La. Ann. 1103, 11 So. 824 (1892).
131. Atkins v. Johnston, 213 La. 458, 35 So. 2d 6 (1948).
132. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1517 (1870).
133. 296 U.S. 93 (1935).
134. See Comment, 38 TuL. L. REV. 372, 389, n.119 (1964).
135. Ibid.
136. The beneficiaries and grantors were all members of an immediate family
group and the donation to the trust was stock in a family corporation.
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CONCLUSION
Where Louisiana powers to revoke differ substantially from
the powers found in the other states, the federal estate and gift
tax effect on these Louisiana powers are not yet fully settled.
In interpolating the position of the Louisiana powers into the
tax law, the economic results of the power should be carefully
'analyzed. If the economic results match an economic result taxed
by the Internal Revenue Code, it is likely that the Louisiana
stipulation will be taxable also. Likewise, if the results do not
fall within a situation taxable by the Code, there is no reason
to believe it is taxable merely because excluding language of the
Internal Revenue Code uses terms which differ from our civil
law terminology.
Charles A. Snyder
